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  Competitive electricity markets are artificial markets with extensive rules for all 
participants arising from the complex interconnections of the electricity network.  Governments 
or regulatory agencies oversee the market design process and the operation and maintenance of 
the market, so market design is necessarily a political process.  The conceptual design of the 
market must recognise the political forces that will operate on the market design process so that 
the political process will not thwart the intended outcome of the market as it has in some 
jurisdictions including Ontario.   
  The limited ability of consumers to understand changes in the electricity sector in the 
short run poses a real constraint on what can be achieved politically.  Letting the market set the 
price means that governments cannot ensure any particular future price level and both theory and 
experience tell us that prices may increase after restructuring (California, Ontario, Alberta).  This 
makes it difficult to sell restructuring to consumers who will be interested in the price they pay 
and not much interested in abstractions like efficiency.   
  Another challenge for electricity restructuring is that the starting points differ from one 
jurisdiction to another and the starting points matter.  The problems are different if you begin 
with a crown monopoly than if you have investor-owned utilities; if expected prices are higher 
than recent prices rather than lower; if governments have been deeply involved in the electricity 
sector rather than distant from it; if the public has experience with stable electricity prices rather 
than fluctuating prices.   
  Finally, the situation in neighbouring jurisdictions matters as well.  Restructuring in a 
low-price jurisdiction surrounded by high prices will increase the prospect of price increases at 
home, while a high-price island is more likely to see its prices decline.  If workable competition 
will be difficult to achieve at home, strong interties to neighbouring jurisdictions can improve 
competitive performance if the market is appropriately designed.  Air pollution, like electricity, 
moves across borders, so one must assess and evaluate the pollution implications of competition 
and make any appropriate adjustments to the market design. 
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1.  Introduction   
 
  Restructuring of the electrical system and its operation involves at a minimum 
eliminating the traditional statutory monopoly on generation and allowing competition in 
generation as well as requiring the transmission owner to transmit power from generators to their 
customers.  It may go further and establish a competitive wholesale power pool that sets an 
hourly (more or less) spot price.  It may require integrated utilities to divest some of their assets 
and owners of the transmission and distribution networks, which remain natural monopolies, to 
be precluded from engaging in competitive activities such as generation and retailing.  At the 
retail level, the distribution utility may retain a monopoly over the supply of electricity to 
customers in its service area, in which case it will purchase power on their behalf under contract 
and on the spot market, overseen by a regulator.  Alternatively retail competition, also called 
retail access, may be mandated, allowing competitive retailers to arrange price terms with large 
customers, or with all customers, paying the distributor for delivering the power.
1 
  The wave of electricity system restructuring during the last fifteen years has been 
stimulated by several forces.  The development of the combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) 
reduced the minimum efficient scale of a generating plant, allowing large electricity consumers 
to install their own generation and facilitating generation by non-utility generators.  The 
development of new metering technology and the information technology infrastructure to 
communicate prices and consumption at low cost has facilitated competition in metering and in 
providing load-management services to consumers.  While these technologies facilitate 
restructuring, however, Joskow (1997, p. 123) argued that the primary driver for restructuring in 
the US was the high prices charged by regulated utilities in the 1990's as they recovered the cost 
of investments in expensive facilities, when falling natural gas prices and increased efficiency of 
CCGT plants reduced the cost of new generation.  Large customers rebelled at paying 6 or 7 
cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to regulated utilities when the marginal cost of wholesale 
electricity was 2.5 cents/kWh and long run marginal cost was 3-4 cents/kWh.  (Joskow, 1997, p. 
126.)  The solution was to introduce competition in generation, dealing with the high costs of 
incumbent utilities through an agreement on the amount of “stranded debt” that would be 
recouped, and who would pay for it.  This seemed to be the logical next step after successfully 
eliminating rate regulation and introducing competition for railroads, trucking, airlines, natural 
gas, and long distance telephone rates from the late 1960's to the 1990's in the United States. 
  Economists like restructuring because it should improve efficiency.  Competitive forces 
in the generation sector should squeeze the inefficiency out of monopoly generators, while 
market discipline should lead to better investment decisions.  The wholesale price should reflect 
marginal cost, and passing this price to consumers should lead to optimal energy use and 
conservation, allowing the price to equate supply and demand in every hour of every day.   
  This paper will explore the institutional side of electricity restructuring.  We start by 
reviewing the history of restructuring in Ontario and, more briefly, in Alberta.  We examine 
electricity pricing to see what goals economists set for competitive markets and what impact the 
resulting pricing schemes have on participants in the electricity system.  We then turn to politics, 
                                                           
1   See Hunt (2002, Ch. 3) for a categorisation and description of restructuring possibilities.  
Electricity Restructuring - DRAFT  3   
evaluating the political forces that have operated on restructuring in Canada, particularly in 
Ontario, what effect they have had, and what implications those forces have for future electricity 
restructuring efforts.  We will explore the importance of institutional starting points, such as 
crown corporations versus investor-owned utilities, on the restructuring process showing that 
initial conditions have a large impact on what is politically feasible.  Finally, we look at the 
importance of neighbouring jurisdictions on the operation of an electricity market and on the 
competitive design that might be feasible.  We will argue that you cannot have a successful 
restructuring without dedicated pursuit of the goal of economic efficiency, but that in addition 
you must pay strict attention to the politics, the starting point, and the neighbours, if your design 
is to succeed in practice. 
 
2.  History of Restructuring in Ontario and Alberta  
2.1.  Ontario  
  Almost a century ago, in 1906, the government of Ontario created the Hydro-Electric 
Commission of Ontario, which Sir Adam Beck developed into the provincial crown corporation 
responsible for generation, transmission and distribution of most of the electricity in the 
province.  In the first half of the 20
th century inexpensive power from the Adam Beck generation 
stations at Queenston Heights on the Niagara River provided low-cost electricity to the province.  
In the 1950's and 1960's HEPCO built coal-fired generating stations and in the 1970's and 1980's 
it added nuclear generation.  The stations built in the second half of the century had much higher 
costs than Niagara Falls and raised average costs considerably.  The Power Corporation Act 
required Ontario Hydro, as HEPCO was renamed in 1972, to provide “power at cost” which has 
become part of the culture and lore of electricity supply in Ontario.  The utility did not pay taxes, 
nor was it intended to generate profits.  The government of Ontario appointed the directors of 
Ontario Hydro, guaranteed all of its debt, and through the Minister of Energy could issue Policy 
Directives to Ontario Hydro.  Ontario Hydro set its own rates, subject to review but not 
amendment by the Ontario Energy Board, and it set or approved rates for many of the municipal 
electric utilities that distribute electricity in areas not served by Ontario Hydro.  With a 
headquarters very close to the Provincial Parliament buildings, Ontario Hydro was always close 
to the government, and there has been debate whether the government controlled Ontario Hydro 
or vice-versa.
2 
  The completion of the Darlington nuclear station in the early 1990's, at a cost several 
times the original estimates, caused price increases exceeding 30% in three years as Ontario 
Hydro rolled the costs into its rates under the principle of power at cost.  The resulting public 
outcry led the government to freeze the price in 1993 somewhat below actual costs, a freeze that 
lasted with little modification until 2002.  In 1995, the Government of Ontario appointed an 
advisory committee chaired by Donald Macdonald to study and assess options for phasing in 
competition in Ontario’s electricity system.  The committee’s report, A Framework for 
Competition was issued in 1996 and recommended the establishment of wholesale electricity 
                                                           
2   For background information on Ontario Hydro, see Daniels and Trebilcock (1996) and the 
Advisory Committee on Competition in Ontario’s Electricity System (1996).  
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competition.  Retail competition was to follow in which distributors would manage a portfolio of 
supply contracts for customers who did not choose a retailer.  The Macdonald Committee 
recommended that Ontario Hydro’s generation assets be divided up among competing units: four 
separately operated nuclear entities with a single owner; that the fossil fuel plants be operated as 
independent units, and that the hydroelectric facilities be established as separate entities for each 
river system.  (ACCOES, 1996, pp. 58-61.)  The government issued a White Paper on electricity 
reform in November, 1997 which suggested that Ontario Hydro should be divided into a 
generation company (now Ontario Power Generation) and a transmission company (now Hydro 
One).  (Ontario, 1997, p. 18.)  There was no suggestion of breaking up or selling off the 
generation assets of Ontario Hydro.  The White Paper proposed to achieve full wholesale and 
retail competition by the year 2000.  (Ontario, 1997, p. 16.)  The government then appointed the 
Market Design Committee which worked through 1998 to recommend an initial market design 
and a set of market rules.  (OMDC, 1999.)  The MDC was given to understand that it should not 
recommend breaking up and selling off the generation assets of Ontario Hydro, so it designed 
mechanisms to attempt to achieve a competitive result anyway, the Market Power Mitigation 
Agreement (MPMA).  It was generally thought that the wholesale price when the electricity 
market opened would be about 3.8 cents/kWh, and independent power producers complained 
that much higher prices would be necessary to render new investment in generation profitable.  
The wholesale price had been around 4.3 cents.  Ontario Hydro’s average total cost was thought 
to be in the vicinity of 4.5 cents/kWh, so a “stranded debt” charge of 0.7 cents would be required 
on top of the market price. 
  Legislation followed that divided Ontario Hydro into a transmission company and a 
generation company, established the Independent Market Operator, and established the 
framework for a competitive wholesale and retail market.
3  Because OPG generated 90% or so of 
the electricity in Ontario, the MPMA provided a revenue cap for OPG at 3.8 cents/kWh which 
was to be relaxed as OPG sold or otherwise divested itself of control of generating capacity.  The 
revenue cap would be lifted entirely when OPG controlled only 35% of the generating capacity.  
(OMDC, 1999, pp. 2-4 to 2-6.)  The wholesale market incorporated an hourly spot market 
managed by the IMO, competition in generation, support for bilateral contracts, and default 
supply by local distribution companies (LDCs) to customers who do not choose a retail supplier.   
Wholesale prices were to be uniform across the province initially, but locational pricing was 
supposed to be examined 18 months after the market opened. (OMDC, 1999, p. 3-7 to 3-9).  The 
Ontario Energy Board (OEB) was to regulate the monopoly elements of the system, including 
distribution and transmission, as well as regulating retailing and other activities.  Restructuring 
considerably increased the workload on the OEB. 
  By 1998 eight nuclear units at Pickering A and Bruce A were out of service for serious 
maintenance and upgrading, although it was expected that most would be back on line before 
market opening.
4  The work proceeded slowly, however, and the by the time the market 
                                                           
3   Electricity Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 15, Sch. A.  The full title is: “An Act to create jobs and 
protect consumers by promoting low-cost energy though competition, to protect the 
environment,  to provide for pensions and to make related amendments to certain Acts.” 
4   Bruce A, Unit 2 was closed in 1993.  In late 1997, three more units at Bruce A and all four 
units at Pickering A were laid up after a report identified management and operational problems.   
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participants were more or less ready for market opening, all eight nuclear units were still 
unavailable.  OPG had, in 2001, leased the Bruce nuclear station to British Energy/Bruce Power, 
thus reducing its share of generation to about 70%.  Unable to delay market opening any further, 
the government opened Ontario’s competitive market on May 1, 2002, utilising a mandatory 
pool and passing the spot price to any consumer who had not signed up with a retailer for a fixed 
price.  About one million consumers had signed contracts with retailers for electricity at prices 
around 5.7 cents/kWh.  Consumers without retail contracts would receive a rebate if the revenue 
received by Ontario Power Generation averaged more than 3.8 cents per kWh over an entire 
year, with the rebate reflecting the proportion of total Ontario generation produced by OPG, 
expected to be about one-half in 2002.    
  Record drought and heat waves in the summer of 2002 combined with a failure to return 
nuclear units to service led to a peak price of $4.71/kWh on July 2, more than 100 times the 
normal price, and a monthly average price for July of 6.2 cents.  (IMO, 2002a, p. 5.)  September 
was worse, with a peak hourly price of $10.28/kWh and a monthly average price of 8.31 cents.  
(IMO, 2002b, p. 5.)  The IMO issued repeated calls for conservation to avoid brownouts and 
blackouts.  Consumers, who faced high bills as a result of higher prices and of running their air 
conditioners heavily during the summer, complained bitterly.  On November 11, 2002, the 
government responded to those complaints and announced a price freeze for smaller consumers 
at 4.3 cents, leaving the wholesale market intact, and thus embracing the second worst feature of 
the California market design.  The freeze would be retroactive to market opening, so that 
customers would receive rebates for the high summer prices.
5  The price freeze eliminated the 
price incentive to conserve electricity at times of shortage for small consumers.  It damaged 
investor confidence, reducing the likelihood of investment in new generation facilities and of 
being able to sell or lease OPG facilities, thus paralysing the decontrol of OPG facilities.   
  In November, 2002, the average price since market opening had been somewhat over 5.5 
cents/kWh, close to 50% above the price expected in 1998.  Yet the MPMA ensured that 
consumers would receive a rebate for about half of the excess over 3.8 cents.  Moreover the 
wholesale price represents less than half of the consumer’s electricity bill.  Table 1 shows the 
components of a typical Ontario consumer’s monthly bill and the cost to the consumer per kWh 
at different wholesale prices.  A wholesale price of 5.5 cents would increase the consumer’s bill 
by 12%, and the net cost after rebate by only 6.2% over the baseline of 4.3 cents.  An average 
wholesale price of 8 cents would increase the monthly bill by 37% and the net cost by 19%.   
The rebate was to be paid at the end of a year, however, and most consumers seemed either 
ignorant of the rebate or indifferent to it.  Moreover, bills increased by more than this because 
consumers used large amounts of electricity for their air conditioning during the summer of 
2002.  One observer said that Toronto consumption was up 20% in the first six months of market 
operation.  (Vegh, 2002.)  Table 1 shows that a 20% increase in electricity consumption alone 
would increase the bill by at least 15%, an increase greater than that caused by the price increase 
over the first 6 months of market operation.  Consumers seem not to have separated the increased 
price from the increased consumption.  
  February, 2003 was the worst month yet, with a peak price during a cold snap of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
By August, 2005, Pickering unit 4 was operating, and 2 and 3 were being abandoned. 
5   Press release, November, 2002, “Eves Takes Action to Lower Hydro Bills,” Premier’s office.  
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$3.75/kWh and a monthly average price of 8.86 cents.  (IMO, 2003a, p. 5.)  The weighted 
average wholesale price for the first full year of market operation to April 30, 2003, was 6.22 
cents/kWh, 64% greater than the expected price of 3.8 cents and 38% above Ontario Hydro’s 
average total cost of a few years previously of 4.5 cents.  Small consumers paid 4.3 cents. 
  On a parallel track, the Premier of Ontario, Mike Harris, had announced in December, 
2001 that the government intended to sell the transmission company, Hydro One.  This was not 
required by the recommendations of the Macdonald Commission which had said explicitly that 
the transmission system could remain publicly owned or it could be operated under private 
ownership as a regulated monopoly.  (ACCOES, 1996, p. 53.)  The privatisation was challenged 
in a court which decided that the Electricity Act did not authorise the sale of shares of Hydro 
One.  In quick succession the Premier announced that privatisation was off the table and then 
that the government would sell only a minority stake; the government passed legislation 
authorising the sale but did not sell.  (Trebilcock and Hrab, 2005.)  During the summer of 2002 a 
scandal erupted regarding compensation of the CEO of Hydro One, and in quick succession the 
government passed legislation allowing it to fire the directors of Hydro One, the directors 
resigned in protest, the government appointed new directors who fired the CEO who then sued 
for millions of dollars in damages for wrongful dismissal.
6  Needless to say, these gyrations 
heightened the unease among investors interested in the electricity business in Ontario.
7 
  The price freeze was extended to somewhat larger consumers in 2003.  It was, however, 
expensive for the government, since the wholesale price in 2003-04 averaged more than 5 cents.  
To mitigate future costs, on April 1, 2004, the price cap for small consumers was raised to 4.7 
cents for the first 750 kWh consumed in a month and 5.5 cents for any additional consumption.  
Some of the nuclear stations were returned to service in 2003 and 2004.  The summer of 2004 
was cool and wet, so wholesale electricity prices were lower than in 2002-03.  Still, the average 
wholesale price in 2004-05 was 5.31 cents (IESO, 2005).  On April 1, 2005, the price cap was 
raised to 5 cents for the first 750 kWh and 5.8 cents for any excess; as well, starting in 
November, 2005, the threshold for the two prices would be 1000 kWh per month for November 
to April and 600 kWh per month from May through September.  In addition, the price that OPG 
would receive for the output of its nuclear units and its baseload hydroelectric units was 
regulated by the OEB.  In the future the regulated two-tier price for small consumers would be 
based on the regulated cost of power from prescribed OPG plants, the capped price of power 
from other OPG assets, the contract cost of power from independent producers, and the forecast 
spot market price.  (OEB, 2005 a, b.) 
2.2.  Alberta  
  In Alberta, there were several integrated utilities including both investor-owned utilities 
and municipal utilities.  Coal was the main fuel, followed by natural gas.  The Alberta market 
design was established by the Electric Utilities Act,
8 in 1995, taking effect January 1, 1996.  It 
adopted a mandatory power pool and passed the spot price directly to consumers, with 
                                                           
6   Bernard Simon, “Ambitious Plans in Disarray at Canada Utility,” New York Times, July 27, 
2002, p. C3. 
7   For a detailed analysis of this period, see Trebilcock and Hrab (2005). 
8   R.S.A., 2001, c. E-5.5.  
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distribution costs and other fees added on.  The wholesale price was determined by bids from 
generators, so the system operators could dispatch plants in merit order and loads could also bid 
load reductions.  Like Ontario, Alberta rejected locational marginal cost pricing (allowing the 
price in various locations to differ based on transmission line congestion).  Local distribution 
utilities retained the obligation to supply customers and the six largest distributors were assigned 
a share of the output of the existing generators at a fixed price.  Consumers in Alberta who were 
worried about price fluctuations were encouraged to purchase hedges to mitigate those 
fluctuations.  (Alberta Energy, 1997; McNamara, 1998.)  Partial retail access, which allowed 
customers to purchase directly from retailers or generators rather than taking their LDC’s price, 
began on April 1, 1999, after amendment of the Electric Utilities Act in April, 1998, with full 
retail access achieved in 2001.  Further amendment to the Electric Utilities Act in 2003 created 
the Alberta Electric System Operator which took over the functions of the former Power Pool 
and the Transmission Administrator.  The AESO operates the spot market and plans the 
electricity system.  (AESO, 2004.) 
  Despite steady economic growth, there was little growth in generation capacity from 
1994 to 1998 pending the resolution of some market design issues.  Wholesale prices were stable 
during most of 1996, but rose sharply during the last quarter of 1996, although the average for 
the year was still only $14.42/MWh.  In 1997 prices averaged $20.39, an increase of about 40% 
over 1996.  The price averaged $42.74 in 1999 and rocketed $133.22 in the year 2000.  (AESO, 
2005, p. 2.)  Consumers complained and the government implemented a consumer protection 
plan, the Regulated Rate Option (RRO).  Residential consumers in 2001 paid a high regulated 
price, 11 cents/kWh, but received a rebate of $40 per month, yielding an average electricity cost 
of 6.5 cents/kWh for an average consumer.  The RRO set a high marginal price for electricity, 
preserving the incentive to conserve electricity, but the fixed monthly rebate relieved the 
financial burden of the high price.  For medium and large commercial and industrial customers 
the price was the same as in the RRO but there was a per-kWh rebate that reduces the net price 
to 7.6 cents/kWh.  Starting in 2002, utilities offered their own RRO rates, which in November 
2002 ranged from 4.8 cents to 6.8 cents/kWh, while retailers offered fixed price contracts.
9  This 
RRO has apparently brought stability to the Alberta market while encouraging conservation.  
However the generation market is highly concentrated, with two firms often setting the price, so 
a truly competitive result seems improbable. 
 
3.  Electricity Pricing: Incentives and Transfers   
  Electricity cannot be stored; it must be generated exactly when it is consumed.  It can be 
transported long distances, but long distance transmission capacity is costly.  These facts cause 
electricity markets to differ substantially from markets for many commodities.  Understanding 
the behaviour of electricity markets requires some understanding of the shape of electricity 
demand and supply functions including the time variations of demand, of average and marginal 
cost pricing, of investment in generation capacity, and of retail competition.  We will consider 
these issues in a hypothetical electrical service area, such as a large metropolitan area. 
                                                           
9   See, http://www.customerchoice.gov.ab.ca/elect/images/summary_2002.pdf .  
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3.1.  Supply, Demand and Price Volatility  
  A typical service area will have three types of generation facilities: baseload, mid-merit 
(medium cost), and peaking.  Baseload plants have high capital cost and low operating cost; they 
can be nuclear, run-of-the-river hydroelectric, or coal-fired thermal plants.  Mid-merit plants 
have moderate capital and operating costs; they are usually coal or oil-fired steam turbine plants, 
or combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT).  Peaking plants have low capital cost and high 
operating cost, and often rely on a simple cycle gas turbine or storage hydroelectric power.  Most 
electric utilities dispatch plants in merit order, meaning that the plant with the lowest marginal 
costs are operated first, then the higher-cost mid-merit plants, and finally the high-operating-cost 
peaking plants.  Merit-order dispatch minimises the cost of generation.   
  The aggregate marginal cost curve for a typical fleet of plants rises slowly over a range of 
output as baseload and mid-merit plants are used, but rises rapidly as capacity is approached and 
peaking plants must be run.  If some of the capacity becomes unavailable, the marginal cost 
curve will shift left.  The mid-merit plants set the system marginal cost much of the time; in a 
competitive market, they usually set the price.  The system marginal cost for PG&E in California 
was about $42/Mwh in a summer night, and over $60 during the day.  (Kahn, 1988, p. 121.)  
Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002, p. 1385) find that the system marginal cost for California 
fossil-fuel plants in 1999 was about $35/mWh below 3,000 MW of load, rising gradually to $40 
at 12,000 MW, and then rising more rapidly to more than $60 at 17,000 MW.  Bunn, Day and 
Vlahos (2000, p. 109) reproduce a marginal cost function for the generators bidding into the 
National Grid Company in the UK with zero marginal cost up to 11,000 MW because the nuclear 
plants cannot be shut down in the short run.  Marginal cost rises irregularly from zero at 11,000 
MW up to 3.5 pence/kWh at 58,000 MW, then becomes very steep, rising to 10 pence at 
60,000MW.  The shape of aggregate marginal cost will vary from one jurisdiction to another 
depending on the mix of generating plants. 
  Turning from supply to demand, empirical studies have found price elasticities of 
demand for electricity to be relatively small in the short run and near unity in the long run.  That 
is, consumers reduce their consumption only by a small amount in the short run, but they reduce 
consumption in proportion to the price increase in the long run.  Baughman, Joskow and Kamat 
(1979, pp. 52, 70) estimated own-price demand elasticities for the residential and commercial 
sectors at -0.19 in the short run (one year) and -1.0 in the long run (20 years), while the 
corresponding elasticities in the industrial sector were -0.11 and -1.28.  Ham, Mountain and 
Chan (1997, 132-137) studied the response of small commercial customers (less than 50 kW 
peak demand) to very short run price changes, looking at peak/off-peak time-of-use (TOU) 
pricing in Ontario and found own-price elasticities of -0.13 in the winter and -0.11 in the 
summer.  Farouqui and George (2002, p. 48) report that TOU pricing results in an elasticity of 
substitution for residential consumers between peak and off-peak of about -0.17 and an on-peak 
own-price elasticity of -0.3, while larger commercial and industrial consumers exhibit elasticities 
in the vicinity of -0.9.  Recent studies of dynamic pricing, in which the price is determined by 
real-time conditions, have yielded higher elasticities than the TOU pricing studied earlier, with 
elasticities greater than -0.5 and with on-peak elasticities greater than off-peak elasticities.  
(Farouqui and George, 2002, p. 49-50.)  These elasticities should increase with the development 
of improved load management technology, the expansion of load management services by 
energy service companies, increased variability of prices, and improved customer information  
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regarding hourly prices and how to respond to them.  
  Restructured markets that are fully competitive use bids by generators to set a wholesale 
spot price reflecting the price-setting bid for that hour.
10  If generators cannot exercise market 
power, this spot price should represent the short run marginal cost of generation.  Economists’ 
enthusiasm for competitive markets arises from the use of this price to equate supply and 
demand in real time; at every moment (or hour anyway) generators and consumers are matching 
supply and demand at a market price.  At the margin, the cost of generation should equal the 
value of consumption.   
3.2.  Price Volatility and Bill Variability  
  Shifts in either supply or demand may substantially increase or decrease the short run 
marginal cost, and thus the efficient price, especially if the system is close to full capacity 
utilization.  In a competitive market, the spot price will respond at once to these factors.  We 
should expect, and we do find, that price can vary considerably over a single day when demand 
approaches system capacity.  Wolak (2000, p. 129, 130) studied price data from five restructured 
markets and found that the standard deviation of hourly prices within a year was actually greater 
than the annual mean price in a few instances, and was at least 1/3 of the mean in half of the 
cases.  Hourly prices were much more volatile in fossil-fuel dominated markets than in markets 
supplied primarily by hydroelectric power.  However when we look at variations among annual 
averages, the hydroelectric systems tend to be more volatile.  The ratio of the highest to the 
lowest annual means in a jurisdiction ranged from 1.68 in England and Wales, to 1.99 in 
Victoria, Australia and 4.36 in Nordpool.  This variation in annual means is very significant.  
Price variability is sometimes discussed in terms of price “spikes” which suggests that high 
prices are transitory events that would have little effect on the average monthly price.  However 
if a system experiences a supply-demand crunch, as happened in California in 2000, in Alberta in 
2000 and in Ontario in 2002 and 2005, the weekly and monthly average prices may be seriously 
affected.  In California, the price rose from an annual average of about $30/mWh in 1998 and 
1999 to an annual average of $115 in 2000.  (Joskow, 2001, Table 1.)  The average Alberta price 
in the year 2000 was 13.9 cents/kWh, more than five times the annual average in 1996, the first 
year of market operation.  The average price in Ontario during the first full year of market 
operation was $62, 38% greater than the average total cost that had existed for several previous 
years.  The annual average for 2003-04 fell to $51, and in 2004-05 it rose slightly to $53.  Figure 
1 shows monthly average prices in Ontario for 2002 through 2005.  Ominously, the prices during 
June, July and August of 2005 are higher than in the same months in any of the preceding three 
years. 
  Unless a utility has considerable excess capacity, reliable plants that are very unlikely to 
suffer extended unplanned shutdowns, and a slowly growing economy or the ability to add 
capacity rapidly, one must assume that there is a significant chance that over a decade a supply-
demand crunch may appear for a week or a month.  This will increase prices.  If significant 
capacity is lost (shutting down a nuclear plant) and has to be replaced with new investment, the 
crunch could last for several years.  Any restructuring of the electricity market should be 
designed to handle these possibilities.  There is the opposite problem that all generation may 
                                                           
10   See Hunt (2002, ch. 7) for a description of several wholesale market arrangements.  
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work well and the economy could go into recession or a major user could close, leaving the 
system with unexpected excess generating capacity.  This will lead to low spot prices, perhaps 
dominated by baseload marginal costs rather than mid-merit marginal costs.  While a delight for 
consumers, this could be a disaster for generators relying on revenue from the spot price.  Again, 
the market design should enable all parties to survive. 
  Charging customers the spot price is quite unlike the traditional practice of charging a 
regulated price fixed for a period of a year or more to all customers in a class: a fixed price/kWh 
at all times for small customers, a fixed price/kWh plus a demand charge for highest usage in the 
billing period for medium users, and perhaps more sophisticated peak-load pricing for largest 
customers.  Indeed, MacAvoy argues that one of the main motivations of price regulation of 
public utilities in the US was to prevent rapid increases in prices, to stabilize prices.  “The 
implication of stability was that the companies licensed for service would offer prices that on 
average over a decade would be no more than sufficient to cover the average total (variable and 
capital) costs of service for all classes of consumers.”  (MacAvoy, 1992, p. 12.)  Ontario Hydro’s 
mandate to produce “power at cost” also assumed the stabilization function - it was not required 
to break even every year. 
  Charging customers a marginal cost price or the spot price may be efficient but it can 
lead to variable electricity bills as was dramatically demonstrated in Alberta in the year 2000 
when persistent high spot prices doubled or tripled normal electricity bills, and in Ontario in 
2002 and 2003.  If the utilities had still been under rate of return regulation, their cost-based 
prices would have barely risen in these years.  Whether the utility operates at high marginal cost 
for 5% of the year or 10% of the year will only modestly affect its total costs.  However if the 
price for all electricity generated in an hour is set by the marginal cost of generation in that hour, 
increasing the amount of time spent at high marginal cost by 5% can substantially increase the 
generator’s revenue and, of course, the customer’s cost.  With marginal cost pricing, small shifts 
in supply or demand can affect the load-weighted marginal cost by much more than they affect 
average total cost. 
  There are several general solutions to the volatility of electricity costs in competitive 
markets.  One is to abandon retail competition and for distributors to purchase a portfolio of 
long-run contracts for the supply of their customers.  This insulates the distributor and its 
customers from the fluctuations in the spot price, abandoning the goal of efficient pricing.  A 
second solution is for retailers or distributors to purchase a portfolio of electricity supply 
contracts covering most of their customer demand and to charge consumers a price that blends 
the cost of this portfolio and of the spot price for the remaining quantity.  Unfortunately the 
marginal price paid by the customer responds only modestly to the spot price, losing much of the 
short-run efficiency of marginal cost pricing.
11 
   The other solution is for retailers or distributors to enter into contracts for fixed 
quantities of electricity at fixed prices and to offer to consumers a price that is fixed for a 
specified quantity, with deviations from that quantity bought or sold at the spot price.  Under this 
pricing arrangement, consumers face the spot price at the margin, but they buy and sell relatively 
little at that price so cost impact is modest.  This combines the efficiency of the spot price with 
cost and revenue stability similar to that of rate-of-return regulation.  Interestingly, in the fall of 
                                                           
11   Many variations are possible.  See, e.g., Borenstein (2001).  
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2000, the California PUC guaranteed that residential customers of San Diego Gas & Electric 
would pay no more than $75 per month for electricity in 2001 for the first 500 kWh per month; 
above that usage they would pay market rates.  (Levesque, 2000, p. 14-15.)   
3.3.  Generation Investment  
  Regulated utilities, with their monopoly on generation, have traditionally forecast future 
demand and planned investment in new capacity to meet it.  Plants are financed in anticipation of 
regulatory approval for the rates to pay for them.  Indeed, one criticism of regulated utilities has 
been over-investment in facilities to minimize risks of power shortages and consumer 
complaints.  Investment planning is made more difficult by the long lead times to plan and 
construct generation facilities: as much as a decade to construct a nuclear plant and as long again 
for environmental and planning approvals; up to five years for coal plant construction and 
another five for approvals; perhaps two years for construction of standard combined cycle gas 
turbine plants.   
  If the wholesale market is competitive, then private investors should be prepared to invest 
in new generation when the forecast wholesale price will bring a satisfactory rate of return on 
that investment.  However there is debate as to the willingness of investors in competitive 
generation plants to face these uncertainties and long lead times unless they can sell most of the 
power under long-term contracts.  In any event, such investments would likely attract risk 
premiums that would increase with the lead time involved and increase with the fraction of the 
load that could not be sold at a fixed price for a decade or two.  While it has been argued that 
competition will lower the cost of new investment by forcing investors rather than customers to 
bear the costs of bad investments, this argument ignores the increased risk premium those 
investors will demand for bearing the risk. Thus capital costs for competitive generators must be 
substantially greater than for a regulated utility making the same investment.  The experience in 
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK shows that private investors will build new capacity under 
some market rules.  Indeed, it has been argued that high prices have stimulated new construction 
in most markets, even California.  (Seiple, 2000; Rose, 2000.)  
  Investors need to know the rules so they can evaluate the investment.  Uncertainty delays 
investment.  Yet restructuring takes time, during which the rules are, necessarily, unclear.  
Investment may stop when restructuring is proposed seriously and not resume until after market 
rules are finally agreed, as in Alberta.  If this takes five years and the economy is growing, a 
supply/demand crunch could emerge by market opening.  The smoothest openings of 
competitive markets have coincided with excess supply, while the worst were those that opened 
with shortages, as in Alberta and California an Ontario. 
  If the new capacity is not small relative to the market, the price must rise above the target 
price, since the new capacity will depress the price once it comes on line.  Over time, 
competitive prices in a market in which capacity investment is not small relative to installed 
capacity may follow a sawtooth pattern, rising until a new plant comes on line, then falling, only 
to rise again as demand grows. 
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4.  Restructuring and Politics  
 
  The politics of restructuring includes two quite different questions.  The first relates to 
the governance of the independent system operator and other institutions that will manage the 
market, dispatch the power, and maintain the rules.  There is some literature on “governance,” 
looking at institutional design, such as how the to structure the system operator in a competitive 
market or what interests should be represented on the board of directors of one or more 
corporations created during restructuring.  Barker, Tenenbaum and Woolf (1997, pp. 47-48) 
mention it briefly.  
  The second question is how a government and/or regulator approaches the restructuring 
process and what forces does it respond to?  Here the literature is relatively thin.  Most of the 
literature on electricity restructuring is descriptive of what has happened in a jurisdiction, or 
prescriptive, with recommendations as to desirable elements of a restructured market.  At the 
theoretical level, there are at least two broad theories as to how governments would behave in 
addressing regulatory issues generally and electricity restructuring in particular.  One is the 
“public interest theory” in which government agencies are assumed to try to determine what will 
maximise public welfare and then to pursue policies to achieve this end.  This is an attractive 
theory except that it seems not to explain much of what governments actually do.  Joskow rejects 
“public interest” as a major force behind electricity restructuring in the US, accepting instead 
special interest pleading, specifically the desire of large customers to pay a price less than the 
average cost of generation in jurisdictions where that average cost is high.  (Joskow, 1997, pp. 
125-27.)  Other models assume that policies emerge as the result of the self-interested activities 
of affected individuals and groups.  One such model is the median-voter model, which predicts 
that voters and their elected representatives will generate policies that reflect the interests of the 
median voter in the relevant group(s).  Stigler (1971) and Pelzman (1976) assume that regulation 
emerges in response to demands by industry for protection, and that regulators are captured by 
the regulated firms; this theory would predict that electricity restructuring would serve the 
interests of the most powerful stakeholders in the industry.  Becker (1983) extended the self-
interested explanation to explore the properties of systems in which self-interested groups 
compete for political outcomes, and Aidt (1998) applied a model of self-interest to the choice of 
environmental policy.  Another set of models looks at the political process, incorporating the 
preferences of politicians and of agencies, so that policies are affected by the demands of 
supporters but also by the relationships of individuals within the government.  (Keohane, 
Revesz, Stavins, 1998, pp. 554-58.)  I have not seen applications of these theories of political 
decisions-making to the electricity restructuring process itself.  I am persuaded that private 
interest theories that recognise the ideology of major political and bureaucratic players will have 
the most explanatory power, and therefore expect that the outcome of a restructuring process will 
be shaped to a large extent by the political influence of the major stakeholders and of small 
consumers/individual voters.  
  Ando and Palmer (1998) conduct an empirical analysis of the factors that induce 
legislators and regulators to adopt retail competition.  Factors that increase the likelihood of a 
state moving toward retail competition include: one interest group that dominates the others; 
high regulated prices; lower prices in adjoining states; and larger price variations among utilities  
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within the state.  The last three factors are all indicators that competition might lower prices for 
consumers as low-price generators outbid high-price generators.  Hirsch (1999) is an historian 
who traces the political power of utilities over a century and finds that there was a consensus 
from early in the 20
th century that electric utilities were a natural monopoly, but that in the US 
PURPA infringed on the power of the utilities starting in 1978, and that subsequently with 
increasing utility problems with the operations of nuclear plants and with meeting growing 
demand in the face of strict environmental requirements there was an increasing belief that 
competition could perform better.  White (1996) calculates the expected gains and losses to 
consumers and utilities in each state and finds that restructuring has proceeded most rapidly 
where the expected price changes are the greatest.   
  Ontario’s move to restructure seems to have been motivated by a broad consensus that 
Ontario Hydro was performing poorly by the 1990's, evidenced by the huge cost overruns at 
Darlington and consequent price increases.  ACCOES (1997, p. 20-24) identified as motivators 
an increasingly competitive climate for Ontario industry; the steadily increasing price of 
electricity which was approaching that of US states; the expectation that electricity competition 
would lower prices in the US; the development of efficient small-scale CCGT generators, and 
the demand for a wider variety of services including metering and energy-management 
technology.  It appears that major power users were strong supporters of competition.  I have 
seen no evidence that small consumers wanted competition or customer choice, but the 
government’s White Paper emphasised choice and the lowest possible prices for consumers as 
well as increasing jobs, presumably because of the competitive advantage that cheaper electricity 
would bring to Ontario industry.  By the time that the MDC was in operation there were furious 
debates between those who thought the competitive price would be as low as 3.8 cents and those 
who said that no new power projects could be brought on line unless prices exceeded 5.5 cents.   
  While the government was attracted by the benefits of competition, it could not bring 
itself to support the necessary structural changes, mainly separating the control of individual 
Ontario Hydro generating stations and selling or leasing some of them so they would compete 
with each other.  It compromised by embracing the benefits but not the costs.  Here it tried to 
please two constituencies - consumers (small and large) who wanted lower prices and those who 
wanted to build new generation.  In practice, the initial high prices displeased consumers and the 
price freeze on November 11, 2002 displeased generators and would-be investors.   
  The MDC’s recommendation to pass the spot price directly to all consumers was radical, 
and was agreed upon by the Committee only after vigorous discussion.  Its advocates liked the 
efficiency of the price signal that it generated, in addition to which it greatly simplified the 
administration of retail competition; if a customer signed up with a retailer the retailer would pay 
the spot price bill and send a bill to the customer based on their agreed price.  The MDC felt that 
the risk of price volatility was addressed by the MPMA rebate, and the government was initially 
persuaded.  In practice, consumers were either insufficiently informed about the rebate or did not 
care.  After six months of market operation, the government could not withstand the public 
outcry and imposed the price cap, thereby satisfying small consumers but destroying investor 
confidence in the Ontario market for the foreseeable future.  The imposition of the price cap was 
a political reaction to vigorous demands by an unorganized but numerous interest group: small 
consumers.  Whether the government understood that this cap would undo all the work of the 
preceding six years is not clear.  If so, it suggests the very short time horizon of the government  
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and its interest in being re-elected, rather than in preserving the new electricity market structure 
that had been erected at great cost.  
  The California electricity crisis was well-publicised in Ontario before our summer of 
high prices yet the Ontario government imposed a retail price cap on top of a market wholesale 
price: similar to the disastrous California price cap that had been roundly condemned by most 
observers.  At an electricity conference in October, 2002 I was asked if we would repeat the 
California crisis.  I explained the flaws in the California market and said in jest that we would 
not repeat the California crisis; we would have our own made-in-Ontario crisis.  On November 
11 the government gave us exactly that.   
  The Ontario experience offers a few lessons regarding the politics of restructuring.  It 
does support the interest group model of political action.  Generators and large consumers 
supported the restructuring process and helped push it forward.  When small consumers 
concluded that they were being screwed by the new market the government stepped in to their 
rescue.   
  Ontario’s experience also suggests the difficulty of developing policy in a field in which 
the underlying assumptions are changing.  In the mid-1990's it appeared that competition would 
lower prices, which caused large consumers to support competition.  By late 2002 it was clear 
that competition could increase prices dramatically, eroding support from large and small 
consumers alike.  While the MDC felt that consumers were protected from priced increases by 
the MPMA, this protection was not sufficient for the high prices that were experienced. 
  How could governments in California and Ontario have ignored principles that in 
retrospect seem self-evident?  Some answers are ominous for all jurisdictions.  The intricate 
interconnections in an electricity system provide enormous opportunities for market participants 
to impose externalities on each other.  (Wilson, 2002.)  Extensive, detailed rules are necessary to 
minimize these opportunities and to ensure an economically efficient market design.
12  Yet every 
jurisdiction is different, so the market must be custom designed each time.  The market is so 
complex that the market participants must be involved in the design to ensure that it meets local 
needs, to ensure that they understand it enough to participate intelligently when it opens, and to 
win their support.  Observers have argued that in California some market participants injected 
design features that served their private advantage while contributing to the flawed performance 
of the market as a whole.
13  Subsequent government intervention made the problems worse, not 
                                                           
12  The Ontario market rules fill more than 20 mb of pdf files.  See 
http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/manuals/marketingdocs.asp (Aug. 9, 2005). 
13   “Getting it done fast and in a way that pandered to the many interests involved became more 
important than getting it right.  The end result was the most complicated set of wholesale 
electricity market institutions ever created on earth and with which there was no real-world 
experience.”  (Joskow , 2001, p. 370.)  “I said that the split between the ISO and the PX was 
primarily a device to create business and profit opportunities for middlemen such as Enron, and 
that the resulting inefficiencies and gaming would ultimately impose large costs on the market 
and on consumers.”  (Ruff, 2002.)  “California built its market design on a flawed premise.  . . .  
[T]he design of the California market embraced the notion that what little the system operator 
would do should be done inefficiently in order to leave even more coordination problems for the 
market to solve.  This was an unprecedented experiment in markets that did not work in theory.   
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better.  In Ontario, the MDC pursued a design that a majority felt would perform efficiently, only 
to have the entire market undermined by subsequent government intervention when prices rose.  
The OMDC worked hard to keep efficiency and the public interest as the guiding principles of its 
deliberations, and the government implemented many of its recommendations but could not hold 
the line once the market opened.  Once the rules are written, how does the government resist the 
pleading of special interests when elected officials are unlikely to understand the technical 
details of the market and may not trust the political instincts of their staff, only a few of whom 
are likely to understand it well enough to give advice that is in the public interest?  What set of 
objectives does the government bring to the table and what set of interests will it respond to?  
These are questions that must still be addressed if we are to pursue electricity restructuring 
successfully. 
  In Ontario’s case, the market design relied initially on a rebate from OPG to protect 
consumers from high prices, although the rebate would be paid at the end of the year, but as 
OPG decontrolled its plants consumers would have to protect themselves from price fluctuations 
by purchasing power from retailers.  There was little experience elsewhere to suggest that most 
consumers would do so.  At market opening the consumer education program was inadequate to 
inform consumers of what was to come.  In particular, the Ontario government had not prepared 
consumers for fluctuating prices.  In the White Paper, the government wrung its hands about 
Ontario’s high prices and said that prices and costs would be driven to the “lowest possible 
level,” only technically avoiding an explicit promise of lower prices.  (Ontario, 1997, p. 11.)  
The full title of the 1998 Electricity Act included the phrase “promoting low-cost energy through 
competition.”  In March, 2002, Minister Jim Wilson said that the Ontario Hydro monopoly was 
responsible for high prices, that consumers would enjoy a safe and reliable supply of electricity 
at the lowest possible cost, and that Ontario would have a reliable supply of electricity for the 
next decade.
14  Nowhere did the government’s publicity say that prices might increase 
significantly.   
  This reveals a second general political problem: the selling of competition.  The public 
will not easily understand the merits of fluctuating prices, nor of high prices at times of power 
shortage, nor even of prices high enough to cover costs.  Governments can sell the public on a 
market if it means lower prices.  If it means fluctuating prices or perhaps generally higher prices, 
the public will resist unless there some immediate crisis that could be solved with higher prices.  
Yet in jurisdictions in which the legacy generation has lower costs than new power sources, and 
this would include most of Canada if we reject new coal plants, competition and marginal cost 
pricing will more likely lead to high prices than low prices.  The difficulty of explaining the 
merits of efficient pricing when it means higher prices is obvious.  So, governments are likely to 
sell competition on the basis of lower prices, which in many plausible circumstances cannot be 
delivered without subsidy.  When prices rise, the public rightly feels cheated and demands 
protection. 
  The implications of these political problems are stark.  Governments have difficulty 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
We now know that it did not work in practice either.”  (Chandley, Harvey, Hogan, 2000, pp. 2-
3.) 
14  “Strengthening Ontario’s Electricity Sector”, interview with Jim Wilson, Globe and Mail, 
March 11, 2002, special supplement, p. M3.   
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resisting public demands for protection when prices rise as evidenced by the reaction in those 
three jurisdictions.  Yet private investment will occur only if investors can reap the high prices as 
well as the low prices.  The business press denounced Ontario’s November 11, 2002 price caps 
as having crushed any hope of new private investment in generation.  Indeed, Ontario has been 
forced to develop other methods of attracting new investment (again copying bad ideas from 
California).
15  The largest risk in competitive electricity markets may not be power shortages or 
heat waves but government intervention - sovereign risk.  It is not clear what a government could 
do to prevent its own future intervention, nor to reassure investors once it has intervened. 
  These are problems for which the solutions are not obvious.  If we became disillusioned 
about economic regulation because real regulators were captured by industry or other powerful 
interests, why do we think that a democratic restructuring process will not succumb as well?  If 
competition means prices set by supply and demand, then prices may go up or down and no 
promise should be made about price levels after competition.  How can a government that 
believes in competition pursue a market design process that is robust to the political pressures 
that may arise during the design phase and after market opening?  I believe that it is too early to 
tell how often this process will create competitive markets that achieve the efficiency gains for 
which they are admired. 
  One can call for market designs that are politically robust as well as being robust to 
technical failures in various parts of the electrical system.  But given the complexity of the 
problem and the lack of agreement on ideal market designs, how would we identify politically 
robust designs and how would we promote them?  I find much to like in pricing systems for 
small consumers that yield real-time marginal prices with modest bill variations, such as the 
Alberta RRO or the San Diego fixed price for a base amount and market price for deviations 
from that amount, but unless a consensus develops around these features, or some others, it is not 
clear what would lead a jurisdiction to choose them.  The design of politically robust markets is a 
work in progress. 
 
5.  The Importance of Starting Points  
  Each jurisdiction will have its own historic features that will influence the development 
of a market and the optimal design as well as the feasible design.  These starting points are 
important because people tend to regard their current situation as a right and while they will 
accept improvements easily, they may resist taking away what they currently have; the disutility 
of a loss exceeds the utility of a gain of the same magnitude.  This is an application of “prospect 
theory” articulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  
  The first starting point is the ownership of the electric utilities by public bodies or by 
private investors.  Ontario had a century-long tradition of ownership by the Province of most of 
the generation and transmission system and municipal ownership of most distribution not owned 
by the Province.  This situation is repeated in much of Canada: provincial and municipal 
ownership dominate the electricity sector except in Alberta, PEI, Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland.  (Canada, 1999.)  During that century the public perception of Ontario Hydro as 
                                                           
15  For discussions of the California debacle, see: Berg et al. (2001), Borenstein (2002), 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002), Joskow (2001), and Sweeney (2002).  
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a public servant - powerful, expert and benevolent - was developed or carefully cultivated.  If 
restructuring requires selling or leasing significant assets that have been publicly owned, the 
public must be persuaded that this is in their interest, which would likely require a major change 
in the public perception of the utility.  This was not remotely accomplished in Ontario.  Despite 
the well-publicised problems that Hydro experienced in the 1980's and 1990's, people continued 
to ask why the government was changing things.  The inability to break up OPG or sell off its 
generating stations, because of public resistance, is a huge barrier to achieving a competitive 
market structure.   
  In Quebec, Hydro-Quebec may have even greater cultural and symbolic importance.  The 
creation and growth of Hydro-Quebec is closely associated with the economic and political 
growth of the Province of Quebec.  It is hard to imagine a situation in which any of the major 
hydroelectric generating stations of Hydro-Quebec could be privatised and sold off to create a 
competitive market structure. 
  Perhaps instead of selling assets of a crown corporation to private investors the utility 
could be divided into separate operating units still owned by the government but with 
instructions each to behave competitively.  Before following this path one would want 
reassurance from successful experience with this model in some area of crown corporation 
activity. 
  On the other hand, in a jurisdiction with investor-owned utilities there is often little 
public affection for the monopoly utility.  In such a situation there is little problem with public 
opinion and one must only confront the legal and financial issues involved in forcing a firm to 
divest itself of some of its assets. 
  A second starting point is whether the public utilities are fully integrated or vertically 
segregated into generation, transmission, and distribution utilities.  Fully integrated utilities must 
be broken up to some extent, at least by separating generation from the other functions.  
Ontario’s situation was mixed, with Ontario Hydro serving a number of large industrial 
consumers directly, and providing distribution service to many, particularly rural, areas of the 
province.  In addition, Ontario had over 300 municipal electric utilities prior to restructuring, the 
smallest with only 113 customers.  (ACCOES, 1996, p. 13.)  Many of these were much too small 
to afford the conversion of their customer software to that appropriate for a competitive market 
and others were too small to acquire the expertise needed to operate in the new environment.  
Consolidation was needed but met with considerable resistance from the MEUs and their 
customers, who disliked handing control of their local utility to strangers.  Jurisdictions with 
vertically integrated utilities will not have to deal with consolidation of the local distribution 
system, but will have to deal with other issues of disintegration. 
  A third issue is whether recent electricity prices are above or below average total costs of 
new plants.  Suppose that a jurisdiction has a monopoly electric utility whose assets include very 
expensive plants, while new generation is expected to involve lower-cost facilities.  This was the 
situation of many US utilities in the 1990s when natural gas was inexpensive, nuclear plants 
were problematic and coal plants faced increasing environmental protection costs.  The main 
problem here is to compensate the utility for its “stranded costs” and to prepare consumers for 
lower prices ahead.  
  In the opposite circumstance, consider a jurisdiction with a monopoly electric utility 
utilising mainly low-cost hydroelectric generation where all the best sites have been used.  Any  
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new generation will have average costs well above the existing system average cost.  This would 
be the situation of HEPCO in 1950 or Hydro Quebec or BC Hydro today.  The first problem here 
is to persuade the public that higher prices are a good thing because they will support new 
generation investment.  This is a major challenge, which the Ontario government did not meet 
prior to restructuring.  The second problem is to decide “who gets the cheap power.”  Simply 
allowing all generators to receive the market price will offer windfall gains to those owning the 
low-cost assets.  One alternative is to offer a two-part tariff in which one block of power is sold 
at a low price and any additional power commands a high price.  This distributes the benefits to 
all power users yet maintains the efficient high marginal cost price for all.   
  The relative costs of new and old generation may be significantly affected by the 
environmental policy of the jurisdiction.  In much of north America coal is the lowest-cost fuel, 
but tough environmental regulations on the traditional pollutants have raised the cost of coal 
generation substantially and a serious policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would raise 
coal costs still further.  Natural gas emits much less air pollution although it still emits 
significant amounts of CO2, so tough air pollution policies favour gas relative to coal, although 
they favour renewable power even more.  Policies that force significant investment in 
renewables will increase the cost of power, since renewables are generally more expensive than 
fossil fuel plants. 
  In the UK, the Thatcher government released electric utilities from an obligation to 
purchase UK coal prior to restructuring, which would have allowed them to buy lower-cost 
imported coal.  In a happy coincidence, North Sea gas came on line at the same time and low-
cost and clean-burning gas captured a large market share, improving air quality and lowering 
prices. 
  A fourth issue is the extent of government involvement in the electricity sector.  In 
Ontario the government traditionally had a close relationship with Ontario Hydro, and was 
accused by some of using it as a job-creation machine, rather than allowing it to focus on 
producing electricity at the lowest possible cost.  One of the potential benefits of restructuring 
would be to increase the distance between the government and the utility.  This is not a benefit 
that most governments would welcome, and it is not one that the public would easily understand 
if it saw the government as the instrument of ensuring that Ontario Hydro served the public 
interest.  After all, the government had “protected” electricity consumers by freezing prices in 
1993.  Indeed, when the public complained about high electricity prices in 2002, the government 
could not resist re-involving itself in defiance of the market it had just established, indeed, 
despite the destruction of the market that this caused.  Moreover the government could not resist 
intervening in the management of Hydro One when an executive’s compensation was criticised.  
The government intervened to bar the sale of some coal-fired power plants that OPG pursued in 
compliance with the MPMA.  The Ontario experience suggests that it should be easier to 
restructure in a jurisdiction in which there had been little government involvement in the past, 
because there is less political power to give up.  
  A fifth starting point is the market structure of generation and the possible market 
structure of generation.  Without a competitive structure, the risks of market power, market 
manipulation and high prices are considerable.  Ontario had six thermal plants that were 
expected to set the price much of the time.  To achieve a competitive generation structure the 
largest of these plants must be owned or at least operated by separate firms.  Not only must one  
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firm not operate two of them, but the operators should not compete in other markets, lest they 
compete less here for fear of retaliation there.  With the varying size of the six thermal plants, a 
competitive structure is possible but not easy to achieve.   
  If a competitive structure will only be achieved with difficulty in Ontario, how can 
provinces with fewer generation plants achieve competitive structures?  Given the vast 
geography of most provinces and the limited capacity of transmission lines, it will not be easy 
for generators to compete with each other.  This is a substantial challenge to spreading the model 
of competition in Canada or elsewhere where generation plants are large and widely spaced. 
  A final starting point is the public’s experience with fluctuating prices for other utilities 
and energy sources.  The public in Ontario was accustomed to prices for electricity that were 
stable for years at a time.  The last experience with rising prices was in the early 1990's when the 
government stepped in and imposed a price freeze.  Natural gas prices had been regulated and 
stable until a decade or so earlier, but by 2002 the public had developed some experience with 
varying gas prices.  Gasoline prices are unregulated and the public is used to substantial 
fluctuations, although they routinely complain to the government about upward fluctuations.  
Interestingly the increase in gasoline prices in 2005 has generated substantial public grumbling, 
but it has not resulted in inappropriate government actions, perhaps because there is no historic 
or natural role for government.  So, the experience in other markets could have prepared 
Ontarians for varying electricity prices, but did not.  One reason may have been that the public 
had come to expect lower prices, so upward fluctuations were seen as a breach of promise. 
 
6.  The Importance of Neighbours  
  As in so much of life, your neighbourhood matters for electricity restructuring.  The 
course of electricity restructuring in a jurisdiction will be affected by several characteristics of 
neighbouring jurisdictions.  The price of electricity in the neighbourhood relative to the home 
jurisdiction will have a significant impact on the enthusiasm of various stakeholders for 
competition.  The extent to which the home jurisdiction shares an airshed with neighbours will 
affect the jurisdiction’s enthusiasm for competition if electricity generation emits air pollutants 
in both jurisdictions.  Finally, the extent and capacity of interties with the neighbours will affect 
the design of a competitive market in the home jurisdiction. 
  Regulated monopoly utilities are usually allowed to charge prices that will recover their 
reasonable costs, whatever those costs are.  Suppose that the home jurisdiction has low costs and 
thus low regulated prices, while the neighbours have high costs and prices.  Under competition, 
generators in the home jurisdiction will be free to sell electricity to neighbouring customers, 
subject to intertie capacity and to the obligation to keep the lights on at home.  Neighbouring 
customers will be keen to purchase cheaper electricity from the home jurisdiction.  Thus 
competition will increase exports from the low-cost jurisdiction to the higher cost jurisdiction.  
This will tend to raise prices in the low-cost jurisdiction and to lower them in the high-cost 
jurisdiction.  With sufficient competition and intertie capacity prices should move close together 
in both jurisdictions.  These effects will be welcomed by generators in the low-price jurisdiction 
and customers in the high-price jurisdiction while customers in the former and generators in the 
latter will be worse off.  Before embarking on a move to competition, governments in both 
jurisdictions should understand the likely effects of competition on their average prices and they  
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should prepare their stakeholders for these effects and ensure that they have the political support 
for restructuring and that they have a market design that will handle the emerging economic 
flows and political pressures.   
  Ontario enjoyed prices that were generally lower than those in adjoining US states prior 
to market opening; indeed, Ontario prices were less than one/half the average US price until the 
late 1980's.   It was recognised that competition might lead to prices rising to meet those in the 
US, so while foreign generators were allowed to bid into the Ontario market, their bids could not 
set the market price.  Instead, the cost of the difference between the foreign bid and the market 
price went into the “uplift,” an amount charged (or credited) to all consumers.  In this way, the 
need to take, for example, 2% of Ontario’s power from a foreign generator whose bid was 10% 
above the price-setting bid in Ontario would raise the market price not by 10%, but only by 
0.2%.    
  Quebec enjoys prices that are substantially below those in Ontario, but there is little 
enthusiasm in Quebec for increasing exports to Ontario because the New York market will pay 
still higher prices.  There appears to be little enthusiasm in Quebec for establishing a competitive 
market that would tend to force domestic prices up to Ontario or even New York levels.  At 
present Quebec consumers benefit from lower prices and the provincial government seems 
happy to leave the benefits with those consumers while extracting the best possible price from 
exports to New York. 
  The home jurisdiction can regulate air pollution emissions from its own generators but 
usually has little influence on emissions from generators in neighbouring jurisdictions.  In 
Canada, the dominant regulations are provincial, while in the US the federal government has 
managed to set standards that are applicable to many states.
16  Suppose that Ontario and Ohio 
both burn coal in mid-merit plants and both have similar emission rates per kWh produced.  In a 
regulated market with monopoly utilities, both Ontario and Ohio would tend to be self-sufficient 
in electricity generation.  If Ontario imposes strict environmental regulations on its coal-fired 
stations, this will raise the marginal cost of electricity from those stations, making imports from 
Ohio more attractive.  In a regulated market, Ontario policy might dictate that imports should not 
increase despite the relative attractiveness of Ohio power.  In a competitive market, however, the 
Ohio generators should be more successful in bidding into the Ontario market, given their lower 
costs, so imports should increase.  Emissions from Ontario will be reduced both because of the 
lower emission rate and because of reduced utilization of the Ontario stations.  Emissions from 
Ohio will increase, however, and the proportion of Ohio pollution that affects Ontario will offset 
the Ontario reduction.  Thus the ultimate effect of the increased stringency of Ontario air 
pollution regulations is less than the initial effect calculated in the absence of an import 
response.  More generally, it will be more difficult to control imports and exports in competitive 
markets than in regulated markets, so pollution control policies in one jurisdiction will have less 
effect than might be estimated. 
  In fact, the Ontario government pledged to close down all coal-fired generation in the 
                                                           
16  For an overview of Canadian environmental jurisdiction see Benidickson (2002, ch. 2); for the 
US see Davies and Mazurek (1998, chs. 1-4.)  
Electricity Restructuring - DRAFT  21   
province by 2007 (now postponed to 2009) and has closed several stations.
17  Without adequate 
replacement power for Nanticoke within Ontario, it is becoming clear that imported power 
would yield increased pollution from the US Midwest, thus substantially offsetting the reduction 
from Nanticoke.  The shutdown only has full effect if the power is replaced by power from a 
non-polluting source. 
  If the pollution rates are different in the home and neighbouring jurisdiction, the 
calculation is more complicated but the same forces are at work.  Tough regulation of a dirty 
domestic source that led to imports from cleaner sources would yield benefits that were only 
modestly offset by the imported pollution.  Tough regulation of an already clean source that led 
to imports from much dirtier sources might completely cancel out the benefits.  The more closely 
coupled the air quality in the two jurisdictions, other things equal, the greater the offset. 
  Finally, competitive markets require a competitive market structure.  In some cases, the 
generation fleet in a jurisdiction will not easily yield a competitive market structure.  In such 
cases, we can look to imports as a possible enhancement of competition.  If a neighbouring 
jurisdiction has several generators that could bid into the home market, and if the intertie 
capacity is sufficiently great, then competitive prices may be achieved even in a home 
jurisdiction that is not workably competitive on its own.  In the case of Ontario, the MDC 
recommended that the interties to the US and Quebec be enhanced specifically to help reduce the 
market power that OPG would otherwise wield until it had substantially decontrolled.  
 
7.  Conclusions  
  The experience with restructuring of the electricity sector in Ontario and Alberta, when 
considered in the light of experience elsewhere, offers several lessons for other jurisdictions 
considering moving down this path.  Replacing monopoly with competition in generation may 
lead to more efficient generation, and it may produce a spot price that can be used as the basis 
for marginal cost pricing of electricity to consumers.  However competition also increases risks, 
and the system design must recognise the possibly limited risk tolerance of market participants, 
so that risks are shared appropriately.   
  Electricity markets are artificial markets with extensive rules for all participants arising 
from the complex interconnections of the electricity network.  Governments or regulatory 
agencies oversee the market design process and the operation and maintenance of the market, so 
these are necessarily political processes.  Some of the participants in an electricity market are 
likely to have substantial political influence.  Both theory and experience provide some guidance 
as to the political forces that will operate on the market design and operation.  The conceptual 
design of the market must recognise these political realities so that the political process will not 
thwart the intended outcome of the market.  So, for example, consumers and generators must 
share risks sufficiently that the government will not intervene with price caps if wholesale prices 
exceed expectations, nor with subsidies if they fall short.   
  Moreover, one might be able to assess, early in the market design process, whether the 
political landscape will support the development of an efficient market that will serve all 
                                                           
17  Press Release, June 15, 2005, “McGuinty Government Unveils Bold Plan to Clean Up 
Ontario’s Air” http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/index .  
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stakeholders well.  In the case of Ontario, in hindsight, we can see the lack of government will to 
sell off Ontario Hydro’s generation plants to create a competitive structure, arising in part from 
the lack of public support for such a radical change from the long-standing crown corporation.  
There is also reason to doubt the government’s willingness to distance itself from the electricity 
business.  While the MDC worked around these problems as much as possible, another 
jurisdiction might postpone restructuring until there is political support for the essential steps. 
  The limited ability of consumers to understand changes in the electricity sector, at least in 
the short run, pose a real constraint on what can be achieved politically.  Ontario’s market design 
included a rebate to consumers if prices increased, yet consumers either were not aware of the 
rebate, could not estimate its effect on them, or were not prepared to wait until the end of the 
year.  Either more effort should have been put into educating consumers or the refunds should 
have been more timely, to reduce consumer complaints which the government could not resist.  
It is quite possible that, after several years of experience with an electricity market, consumers 
would become relatively sophisticated in their understanding of it and their strategies for 
working with it.  However stresses may arise in the short run and the market has to survive until 
the long-run learning can take place. 
  One of the challenges for electricity restructuring is that the starting points differ from 
one jurisdiction to another and the starting points matter.  The problems are different if you 
begin with a crown monopoly than if you have investor-owned utilities; if expected prices are 
higher than recent prices rather than lower; if governments have been deeply involved in the 
electricity sector rather than distant from it; if the public has experience with stable electricity 
prices rather than fluctuating prices.  Each of these has implications for the market design and 
for the feasibility of restructuring. 
  Finally, the situation in neighbouring jurisdictions matters as well.  Restructuring in a 
low-price jurisdiction surrounded by high prices will increase the prospect of price increases at 
home, while a high-price island is more likely to see its prices decline.  If workable competition 
will be difficult to achieve at home, strong interties to neighbouring jurisdictions can improve 
competitive performance if the market is appropriately designed.  Air pollution, like electricity, 
moves across borders, so one must assess and evaluate the pollution implications of competition 
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Table 1 
Effect of Wholesale Price on Ontario Residential Consumer’s Bill 
 Example, 2002 
  Consumer not signed up 




Monthly average wholesale price (cts/kWh)  4.3 5.5 8.0 5.7
Wholesale Charges
1 (cents/kWh)  1.32 1.32 1.32  1.32
Transmission
2 and distribution
3 (cents/kWh) 2.38 2.38 2.38   2.38
Total of -per kWh charges (cents/kWh)  8 9.2 11.7  9.4
Total charge for 700 kWh ($)  $56.00 $64.40 $81.90  $65.80
Monthly customer charge (fixed)  $14.00 $14.00 $14.00  $14.00
GST @ 7%   $4.90 $5.49 $6.71  $5.59
Monthly bill   $74.90 $83.89 $102.61  $85.39
% bill increase from price > 4.3 cents  0.0 12.0 37.0  14.0
Rebate
4   ($1.87) ($6.37) ($15.73)  None
6
Net cost after rebate   $73.03 $77.52 $86.88  $85.39
% net cost increase from price > 4.3 cents  0 6.2 19.0  16.9
Monthly bill for 20% more electricity  $86.10 $97.67 $120.14  $99.47
% bill increase for 20% more electricity
7 15 16.4 17.1  16.5
1.  Debt reduction charge 0.7; IMO and other charges 0.62/kWh. 
2.  Transmission charge 1.04 cents in 2002.   
3.  Distribution charges vary among municipalities; Toronto charge was 1.34 cents/kWh. 
4.  Assuming that the Market Power Mitigation Agreement rebate equals half of the excess of the 
wholesale price over the MPMA price of 3.8 cents.  Including GST @7%. 
5.  Consumers who have signed retail contracts pay the contract price rather than the wholesale 
electricity price.  5.7 cents is within the range of contract prices offered in 2002. 
6.  Many retail contracts provide that any rebate will be paid to the retailer, not to the consumer.   
7.  Not considering the rebate; baseline is the same price in this column. 
.  
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Figure 1 
Hourly Ontario Electricity Price, Weighted Monthly Average  













May-02 Nov May-03 Nov May-04 Nov May-05 
Electricity Restructuring - DRAFT  25   
References  
 
ACCOES, Advisory Committee on Competition in Ontario’s Electricity System, 1996, A 
Framework for Competition, Toronto: Queen’s Printer. 
 
Aidt, Toke S., 1998, “Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environmental 
Policy,” Journal of Public Economics, 69: 1-16. 
 
Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), 2004, Annual Report, 
http://www.aeso.ca/files/2003_annual.pdf , August 25, 2005. 
 
Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), 2005, Fast Facts, 
http://www.aeso.ca/files/corpprofileJuly05.pdf , August 25, 2005. 
 
Alberta Energy, 1997, “Moving to Competition”, brochure, Alberta Department of Energy, 
Electricity Branch: Edmonton.  ISBN 0-7732-0943-3. 
 
Ando, Amy and Karen Palmer, 1998, “Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-level 
Electricity Restructuring,” Resources for the Future DP 98/19, March, 1998.  
Washington, D.C. 
 
Barker, James, Bernard Tenenbaum, Fiona Woolf, 1997, “Governance and Regulation of Power 
Pools and System Operators: An International Comparison,” Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
 
Baughman, Martin l., Paul L. Joskow, Dilip P. Kamat, 1979, Electric Power in the United States: 
Models and Policy Analysis Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  
 
Becker, Gary, 1983, “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” 
Quarterly J. Econ. 98: 371-400. 
 
Benidickson, Jamie, 2002, Essentials of Canadian Law: Environmental Law, 2
nd edn. Toronto: 
Irwin Law. 
 
Berg, et al., 2001, “Manifesto on the California Electricity Crisis”, January 26, 2001, 
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/news/california_electricity_crisis.html . 
 
Borenstein, Severin, 2001, “The Troubles with Electricity Markets and How They Derailed 
California’s Electricity Restructuring,” http://www.aei.org/past_event/conf010614a.pdf .  
 
Borenstein, Severin, 2002, “The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s 
Restructuring Disaster”, J. Econ. Perspectives 16:1, Winter, 191-211.  
  
Electricity Restructuring - DRAFT  26   
Borenstein, Severin, James B. Bushnell, and Frank A. Wolak, 2002, “Measuring Market 
Inefficiencies in California’s Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market,” Am. Econ. 
Rev. 92:5, Dec. 2002, pp. 1376-1405;  
 
Bunn, Derek W., Christopher Day and Kiriakos Vlahos, 2000, “Understanding latent Market 
Power in the Electricity Pool of England and Wales”, Ch. 7 in Ahmad Faruqui and Kelly 
Eakin, eds, Pricing in Competitive Electricity Markets, Boston: Kluwer. 
 
Canada, 1999, Electric Power in Canada, 1997, Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada. 
 
Chandley, John D., Scott M. Harvey and William W. Hogan, 2000, “Electricity Market Reform 
in California”, http://www.aei.org/past_event/conf010614b.pdf .   
 
Daniels, Ron and Michael J. Trebilcock, 1996, “The Future of Ontario Hydro: A Review of 
Structural and Regulatory Options,” in Ron Daniels, ed., Ontario Hydro at the 
Millennium, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, pp. 1-52. 
 
Davies, J. Clarence and Jan Mazurek, 1998, Pollution Control in the United States, Washington 
DC: Resources for the Future. 
 
Faruqui, Ahmad and Stephen S. George, 2002, “The Value of Dynamic Pricing in Mass 
Markets,” The Electricity Journal, 15:6, July, pp: 45-55.  
 
Ham, John C., Dean C. Mountain, M.W. Luke Chan, 1997, “Time-of-use Prices and Electricity 
Demand Allowing for Selection Bias in Experimental Data,” Rand J. of Econ. 28:0, 
S113-S141. 
 
Hirsch, Richard F., 1999, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the 
American Electric Utility System, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Hunt, Sally, 2002, Making Electricity Competition Work, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
IESO, 2005, “Market Year Review May 2004-April 2005”, Independent Electricity System 
Operator, 
http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/marketReports/MarketYearReview_2005apr.pdf , 
accessed Aug 2, 2005. 
 
IMO, 2002a, “Monthly Market Report, July, 2002,” Independent Market Operator, Toronto; 
http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/marketReports/monthly/2002jul.pdf , Aug. 2, 2005. 
 
IMO, 2002b, “Monthly Market Report, September, 2002,” Independent Market Operator, 
Toronto; http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/marketReports/monthly/2002sep.pdf , Aug. 2, 
2005. 
  
Electricity Restructuring - DRAFT  27   
IMO, 2003a, “Monthly Market Report, February, 2003,” Independent Market Operator, Toronto; 
http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/marketReports/monthly/2003feb.pdf , Aug. 2, 2005. 
 
Joskow, Paul L., 1997, "Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. 
Electricity Sector," J. of Econ. Perspectives 11:3, Summer, 1997, pp. 119-138. 
 
Joskow, Paul L., 2001, "California's Electricity Crisis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 17:3, 
365-388.  
 
Kahn, Edward, 1988, Electric Utility Planning and Regulation, Washington: American Council 
for an Energy-Efficient Economy.  
 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, 1979, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under Risk,” 
Econometrica 47: 263-291. 
 
Keohane, Nathaniel, Richard Revesz, Robert Stavins, 1998, “The Choice of Regulatory 
Instruments in Environmental Policy,” Harvard Environmental Law Review 22, pp. 313-
367. 
 
Levesque, Carl J., 2000, “California Price Wars,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, Oct 1, 2000, p. 
14-15. 
 
MacAvoy, Paul W., 1992, Industry Regulation and the Performance of the American Economy, 
New York: Norton. 
 
McNamara, Fergal, 1998, “Alberta’s Electricity Market: How it Works, Recent Developments, 
New Opportunities,” PowerPoint presentation by the Vice-President of ESBI Alberta Ltd. 
 
OEB, 2005a, Press Release, “OEB issues reminder on details of the recently announced New 
Price Plan,” Ontario Energy Board, July 22, 2005. 
 
OEB, 2005b, “Regulated Price Plan Manual,” Ontario Energy Board, August 22, 2005. 
 
OMDC, 1999, “Final Report of the Market Design Committee,” January, 1999. 
 
Ontario, 1997, “Direction for Change: Charting a Course for Competitive Electricity and Jobs in 
Ontario”, Ontario Ministry of Energy, Science and Technology: Toronto. 
 
Peltzman, S., 1976, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” J. Law and Econ. 19, pp. 
211-240. 
 
Rose, Judah, 2000, “Price Spike Reality: Debunking the Myth of Failed Markets,” Public 
Utilities Fortnightly Nov. 1, pp. 52-56. 
  
Electricity Restructuring - DRAFT  28   
Ruff, Larry, 2002, “Statement of Larry E. Ruff, PhD on California State Senate Bill No. 2000, 
Unlawful Electric Power and Natural Gas Practices,” Before the California Senate 
Judiciary Committee, April 23, 2002. 
 
Seiple, Chris, 2000, “Oversupply Ahead,” Public Utilities Fortnightly Oct. 15, pp. 10-12. 
 
Stigler, George, 1971, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell J. of Economics and 
Management Sciences, 2, pp. 3-21. 
 
Sweeney, James, 2002, The California Electricity Crisis, Hoover Institution Press: Stanford. 
 
Trebilcock, Michael and Roy Hrab, 2005, “Electricity Restructuring in Ontario,” The Energy 
Journal 26:1, 123-146. 
 
Vegh, George, 2002, “Power’s Too Cheap,” Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 15, p. A19. 
 
White, Matthew W., 1996, “Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity 
Markets,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1, Microeconomics, 201-50. 
 
Wilson, Robert, 2002, “Architecture of Power Markets”, Econometrica, 70:4, July, 1299-1340. 
 
Wolak, Frank A., 2000, “Market Design and price Behaviour in Restructured Electricity 
Markets: An International Comparison,” in Faruqui, Ahmad and Kelly Eakin, eds, 
Pricing in Competitive Electricity Markets, Boston: Kluwer. pp. 125-152.  